Et Capital Culture

What is most singular is that the less natural and pressing the needs, the more the passions increase and, what is worse, the power to satisfy them; so that after long periods of prosperity, after having swallowed up many treasures and ruined many men, my hero will end by butchering everything until he is the sole master of the universe. This, in brief, is a faithful representation of our mores- if not of human life, then at least of the secret pretensions in the heart of every civilized man.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, note ix.

 

There is in every breast a sensibility to marks of honor, of favor, of esteem, and of confidence, which, apart from all considerations of interest, is some pledge for grateful and benevolent returns. Ingratitude is a common topic of declamation against human nature; and it must be confessed that instances of it are but too frequent and flagrant, both in public and in private life. But the universal and extreme indignation which it inspires is itself a proof of the energy and prevalence of the contrary sentiment. 

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 57. 

 

There is, therefore, a purely civil profession of faith, the articles of which it belongs to the sovereign to establish, not exactly as dogmas of religion, but as sentiments of sociability, without which it is impossible to be a good citizen or a faithful subject.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract, Book IV, Chapter IX. 

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Efforts to improve society are commonly called causes. What Jean-Jacques Rousseau calls the sentiments of sociability are a cause affirming the basic dignity of all members of society. The sentiments are the proportionate cause, socially, to the establishment of a minimum wage, economically.

 

The sentiments are the basic customs and mores that prescribe thought and expression. They are critical to the bottom-up observance of order. This is a fundamental feature of a government by the people. As a governing tool, the sentiments are similar to what Confucius calls ritual propriety (li). 

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Ritual propriety is a code of conduct that promotes order through the observance of tradition with deference to hierarchy. Throughout The Analects, Confucius emphasizes how adherence to ritual propriety and filial conduct (keeping one's house in order) are the basic building blocks of good governance- a folk governing itself. Indeed, the idea is that if  individuals and their families are well-ordered and well-attended to, then governance of a large society will not require onerous regulations and bureaucracy. Success on the ground-level has a great effect on the welfare of the whole society from the bottom-up. While law is the frame of society, ritual propriety and filial piety are the glue that holds it together.

 

Confucius said, "Lead the people with administrative injunctions and keep them orderly with penal law, and they will avoid punishments but will be without a sense of shame. Lead them with excellence and keep them orderly through observing ritual propriety and they will develop a sense of shame, and moreover, will order themselves." [1]

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Confucius' ritual propriety and Rousseau's sentiments of sociability converge not in their exact prescriptions for good order, but in principle, their means for achieving it. Both encourage conformity through the marketplace of honor, esteem and shame. Both believe that the folk must overcome their egos in order to realize their best roles in society.

 

Confucius' commitment to meritocracy and Rousseau's  commitment to egalitarianism stand apart. Confucius builds a society based on the family and one's merits. Rousseau builds a society based on national membership and utter equality (of wealth and voice). 

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There are forces in modern society that pull from the Confucian and Rousseauian concepts of meritocracy and egalitarianism. It appears that the conflict between them never dies. Nonetheless, shared between them is the desire to instill in society an animus to regulate 'itself.' The common problem they share between them is what Rousseau calls egomania and what Confucius calls pettiness. In either case, shame and its product, humility, is stifled by individual ambition and its product, narcissism. Ritual propriety and the sentiments of sociability attempt to amend the nature of man in society to help bring about order and prosperity. 

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From the Top

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Rousseau argued that the general will of the folk is affirmed and enshrined in what he calls the social contract. The social contract legitimizes the consensus that bought it about. It also authorizes equal participation in society among all members. Laws and the sentiments of sociability follow. As one voice of many, the folk dictates to and regulates 'itself.' 

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Rousseau argues that absent the observance and enforcement of the sentiments,"it is impossible to be a good citizen." The folk are empowered by it to move for it. Its observance and enforcement are pivotal to the bottom-up regulation of membership and participation.

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Rousseau was a staunch supporter of democracy, tolerance and equality in a world still bloodied from religious wars, still intolerant of differing religious sects and still monarchical. While this article is not a proper summation of Rousseau's thought on society, we give enough attention to its necessary parts to define the now oft-repeated phrase: sentiments of sociability.

 

First, Rousseau believed that man is good in nature. Something changes his behavior for the worse when he transitions to living in society. By virtue of these changes, life in society is defined by chains. Second, Rousseau argued that the folk is best suited to regulate 'itself.' One social regulatory tool that is of a great significance to our discussion is censorship. Rousseau argued that censorship is the best means by which society maintains adherence to the sentiments. 

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One

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Alone in the "state of nature" man is absolutely free. Only the forces of nature infringe upon his will. All of his actions are self-imposed, self-contained and free. 

 

Man's instincts are good by nature. When confronted with danger, he is moved by adrenaline to fight or flight in order to secure his survival. When witness to unnecessary suffering, he is moved by pity to help reduce the suffering. Therefore, he is naturally endowed with the capacities of independence and morality.  

 

In nature, man is cool, calm and dispassionate. He is rational and responsible. He is independent as the sole architect of his fate and fortune. 

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In nature, crimes of passion cannot dirty the name of love with its tandem hate.

There are no cuckolds who thirst for vengeance and blindly kill. 

Indeed, much of what causes the most detestable outcomes in society are simply unimaginable in nature:

 

There is no ideology. 

There is no religion. 

No demagogues or high priests. 

No panhandling idlers. 

No racism, prejudice or hate. 

There are no lies, for only truth is helpful.

There is no beauty, for there is no love. 

There is no lust, for there is no beauty. 

There is no vindictiveness, for there is no hierarchy. 

There is no shame, for there is no contempt. 

There is no cheating, for there are no rules. 

There is no fraud, for there is no cunning. 

There is no stealing, for there is no property.

There is no hopelessness, for there are no ideals. 

 

Introduce man to society and his natural proclivity to goodness is corrupted by a new propensity to lie, cheat and steal. In society, man becomes passionate and egomaniacal: stepping on the toes and egos of his fellows all the way up the socio-economic and political ladders. Confederations impose their ideologies like viruses. Zealots and demagogues spew prescriptions with eternal ultimatums. Zero-sum politics consume the daily journal at the Pynx: "one person’s loss almost always brings about another’s prosperity.” [2][3]

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There is something natural about man in society that is entirely unnatural to man in nature. Perhaps now we sympathize with James Madison and Alexander Hamilton's views that political parties are "the natural disease of popular government" and that insurrections are "inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions are from the natural body." [4] The social man has natural tendencies that, like diseases of a natural cause, are entirely undesirable. [5] The nature of man in society is entirely unique to him and entirely foreign to the man in the state of nature.

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With a pen for drama, Rousseau describes society as bound by chains: "everywhere man is born free and everywhere he is in chains." He argues that he did this voluntarily, “in the belief that [he] secured [his] liberty...” [6] The caveat to his "liberty" is that he who refuses his shackles must be "forced to be free."[7] The paradox is purposeful and helps illustrate the need to restrain man in society and stamp out dissenters who threaten the order. 

 

Man in society and society writ large are the chicken and the egg of viciousness: "It is not as a first principle the social institution that is responsible for inequality, but the socialized man." [8] It follows that the institutions of society cannot escape the verdict: “For the vices that make social institutions necessary are the same ones that make their abuses inevitable.” [9] Man in society is cunning, deceitful and ambitious. Measures are taken to reduce these traits, but their expressions are inevitable. 

 

Rousseau argues that man in society wears chains in order “give them in turn to others.” [10] Egomania and ambition motivate him to navigate society for all of its unique features: esteem, status and power. Inevitably, blind ambitions make up "the secret pretensions in the heart of every civilized man.” [11] Everyone keeps a copy of The Prince warm in their breast pocket. 

 

Rousseau is generally distrustful of man in society. This stands in stark contrast to his belief that man is good in nature. Society leads him astray. He argues that a choice must be made. He either locks himself in chains and comports to the sentiments of sociability or is censored, or worse, cast out into exile. Bound by law and checked by the sentiments, the effect of society on man is modestly reduced, bringing about a semblance of order and freedom.  

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Two

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Rousseau equates the dictates of the folk with the voice of God (“Vox Populi, Vic Demi”). In a marketplace of esteem, the folk are authorized to distinguish the good from bad. This contrasts with traditional thought greatly. For example, Confucius said, "The authoritative person alone has the wherewithal to properly discriminate the good person from the bad." [12] Rousseau argues that members of a democratic civil society, founded by the general will and enshrined in the social contract, makes no one member more or less "authoritative" than another. Therefore, the folk's opinions and desires are together one authoritative voice. [13]

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Judgement is vested in the folk. The idea is simple. Since social participation is pivotal to membership, then its sanction is significant. Therefore, the folk’s principal social regulatory devices are censorship and exile. Devices that restrict participation partly or wholly. 

 

In a marketplace of public esteem the folk "differentiate between wicked and good men." [14] In this enterprise the folk is "occasionally deceived but never corrupted." [15] As the “true judge of mores,” the folk recognize members of society who act in accordance with the sentiments of sociability. [16] In this regard, the sentiments establish the rituals required of members to reflect what is considered good. The sentiments presume timelessness much like how traditions and rituals do. Though, it is clear that neither rituals nor sentiments last forever. 

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The social contract obliges each member to the other legally, but the sentiments bind their spirit together. Where the laws fail the mores succeed. Where the mores are strong, the need for laws decrease. Rousseau writes: 

 

It is not engraved on marble or bronze, but in the hearts of citizens. It is the true constitution of the state. Every day it takes on new forces. When other laws grow old and die away, it revives and replaces them, preserves a people in the spirit of its institution, and imperceptibly substitutes the force of habit for that of authority. I am speaking of mores, customs, and especially of opinion, a part of the law unknown to our statement but one on which depends the success of all the others… [17]

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Censorship is a decentralized power of the folk to sanction participation in civil discourse and civil service. If esteem in society is as highly appraised as Rousseau has it, then the sanction of the folk is a severe judgement. In our society, censorship is both enacted by law through a Federal proxy like the FCC or by the folk through social organization. Given the First Amendment in the United States, censorship is largely the task of the folk. Thus, private corporations and private associations censor (and exile) trespassers of the sentiments. 

 

Censorship by the folk is “the declaration of the public judgement” and serves as a safeguard against subversives. Effective censorship maintains the mores of the folk “by preserving their rectitude through wise applications” but occasionally, as we all know, hastily make “a determination on them when they are still uncertain." Acknowledging potential harm does not take away from the cause or end of censorship. In a sort of social engineering calculus, censorship is a means to “Reform men’s opinions” so that “their mores will soon become purified by all themselves." [18] It is organic to 'itself' with the explicit goal of supporting the dignity and equality of all members.

 

Unified by "a sensibility common to all its members, a force or will of its own… tends toward its preservation." [19] The sentiments are not revolutionary, but rather, they are conservative. The sentiments seek to conserve the foundational element of the social contract: firstly, legal equality, secondly, relative equality, and thirdly, perceived equality. 

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The sentiments of sociability affirm equality. Censorship and exile are the two principal means by which members of society enforce the sentiments. When these regulatory tools are not abused, they promote shame, decency and, in turn, order from the bottom-up. When they are abused and they are recognized as being abused, countervailing forces root out and eliminate the sources of abuse. In this judgment, we reconcile Rousseau's ideal with the real, that organic social forces are corruptible, including those who are purportedly animated by the sentiments. Just as pettiness and egomania survive the social contract, so do absurdities and atrocities. [20]

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In the next article we will explore civil religion and how it is tied to the Moral Economy.

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Note on Exile 

 

Exile is a social regulatory device organic to society everywhere. In Athens they practiced a legal form of exile sanctioned by the vote of the citizens called, ostracism. Other polities in the Hellespont also practiced ostracism or petalism (the same thing by principle). While we will focus on the practice of exile in democratic civil society we also recognize its practice in autocracies. Without a doubt, the character of its practice in a democracy contrasts severely with the character of its practice in an autocracy. In our case, we will focus on how censorship and exile contribute to the exercise of the Moral Economy, its heritage and its future. 

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